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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
praisal formula, for tenants will pay the same rent regardless of whether it is
collected by the owner or the lessee-manager.
The right to a specific return on the investment has not previously been
predicated on ownership alone, but on the right of a landlord to a fair return.
When the state government took over rent control from the Federal Govern-
ment in 1950, its Rent and Eviction Regulations were copied almost word for
word from the existing federal regulations, and the state adopted this definition
of landlord: "An owner, lessor, sublessor, assignee, proprietary lessee of a
housing accommodation . . . or other person receiving or entitled to receive
rent for the use or occupancy of any housing accommodation or an agent of
any of the foregoing.120 Since it is the person in possession and control who is
entitled to the rents, and since New York speaks of the right of a landlord to
rents without setting up a hierarchy among owners, lessees and others con-
sidered landlords, the majority opinion is in keeping with precedent. It does
not couple a maximum six percent return to a particular estate's investment in
the property, but makes it depend solely on the right of a statutory landlord
to a six percent return on the value of the property standing apart from the
fortuitous or non-fortuitous investment of owner or lessee.
APPLICATION OF DECONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF RESIDENTIAL RENT LAW
The New York State Residential Rent Law2 ' provides in part; "housing
accommodations which are rented after April first, nineteen hundred fifty-
three and have been continuously occupied by the owner thereof for a period
of one year prior to the date of renting" are not subject to control. In Capone
v. Weaver,2 2 the landlord petitioner, sought to annul a determination by the
Rent Administrator that his apartment was not decontrolled under the above
statute. Petitioner owned several apartments, one of which was occupied by
tenant, who had intervened in the instant case, and one by himself.
In 1954, petitioner, because of a family situation causing hardship, sought
to exchange apartments with the tenant, but the tenant refused, as he had
tenure under the above statute and controlled rents. Upon the tenants refusal,
petitioner obtained an eviction of this tenant on the conditions, imposed by the
Rent Administrator, that he offer to exchange apartments with the tenant and
offer him a two year lease at the then present rent. Upon the lease's expiration,
petitioner informed the tenant that he could continue to occupy the premises
on a month-to-month basis, at double the rent. The tenant claimed a violation
20. N.Y. Rent and Eviction Regulations § 2(6) N.Y. UNcoNso,. LAWS (McKinney
Supp. 1959); means person in possession and control in People v. S. A. Schwartz Co., 7
Misc. 2d 635, 165 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1957). For Federal definition, see, Rent Regu-
lation for Housing in New York City Defense Rental Area, § 13(a) (8): "'Landlord'
includes an owner, lessor, sublessor, assigness or other person receiving or entitled to
receive rent for the use or occupancy of any housing accommodations, or an agent of
any of the foregoing." Cited in Woods v. William A. White & Sons., 172 F.2d 356 (2d Cir.
1949).
21. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1946, c. 27, § 2(h).
22. 6 N.Y.2d 307, 189 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1959).
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of the Residential Rent Law in a proceeding before the Rent Administrator
who ruled that the tenant's apartment had not become decontrolled, since the
exchange was for the landlord's benefit and merely a substitution of controlled
housing accommodations. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but the
Appellate Division2 3 reversed, holding that the above statute demands only
two conditions; (1) a renting after April first, Nineteen Hundred fifty-three,
and (2) continuous occupancy by the owner for one year prior to renting.
Since petitioner landlord met both provisions, the disputed apartment must be
ruled decontrolled.
It is a common proposition that the literal meaning of an unambiguous
statute should be followed,2 4 but the purpose which the statute is to effect
must be given precedence.25 "A thing which is within the letter of the statute
is not within the statute unless it is within intent of the lawmakers." 26 Prior
lower court decisions2 7 on almost identical fact situations as the instant case,
have held that such exchanges for the landlord's benefit do not result in rent
decontrol for the tenant. The purpose of the instant statute was to induce
owner-occupiers to make their housing accommodations available to the rental
market. This being the purpose, the legislature could not have intended to
penalize a tenant with a controlled apartment who exchanges with a landlord,
for the latter's benefit.
The Court of Appeals felt the Rent Administrator had made an equitable
adjustment of the interests of the parties, the landlord getting the larger apart-
ment and the tenant getting the landlord's apartment, subject to rent control.
The Court made reference to decisions which allowed departure from the literal
meaning of a statute2" and held that the Rent Administrator's determination
was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and a clear case for administrative
discretion. In giving great weight to the administrator's interpretation of the
rent control statute, under diverse conditions, the court reaffirmed a policy, i.e.
to leave undisturbed an administrative ruling where it is not clearly shown to
be contrary to law.
29
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT COVENANTS IN A LEASE
Landlord and tenant entered into a lease whereby premises were to be used
for storing and shipping of goods. The certificate of occupancy then in effect
permitted the first floor of the leased premises to be used as a dance hall. In
the lease, the landlord covenanted to make application to obtain a certificate
23. 7 A.D.2d 1004, 184 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1958).
24. Lawrence Const. Co. v. New York, 293 N.Y. 634, 59 N.E.2d 630 (1944).
25. People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 8 N.E.2d 313 (1939).
26. River Brand Rice Mills Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d
545 (1953).
27. Brettler v. Weaver, 14 Misc. 2d 1031, 177 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Ashen v. McGoldrick, 17 Misc. 2d 23, 189 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
28. New York Post Co. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957); See
also, supra notes 25 and 26.
29. People v. McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 113 N.E. 795 (1916); See also, Ry. Comm'r
v. Rowen and Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1914); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
179
